New advances in machine learning and the abundance of speech datasets have made Automated Speech Recognition (ASR) systems, with very high accuracy, a reality. ASR systems offer their users the means to transcribe speech data at scale. Unfortunately, these systems pose serious privacy threats as speech is a rich source of sensitive acoustic and textual information. Although offline ASR eliminates the privacy risks, we find that its transcription performance is inferior to that of cloud-based ASR systems, especially for real-world recordings. In this paper, we propose Prεεch, an end-to-end speech transcription system which lies at an intermediate point in the privacy-utility spectrum of speech transcription. It protects the acoustic features of the speakers' voices and protects the privacy of the textual content at an improved performance relative to offline ASR. Prεεch relies on cloudbased services to transcribe a speech file after applying a series of privacy-preserving operations on the user's side. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of Prεεch, using diverse real-world datasets, that demonstrates its effectiveness. Prεεch provides transcriptions at a 12.30% to 32.24% improvement in word error rate over Deep Speech, while fully obfuscating the speakers' voice biometrics and allowing only a differentially private view of the textual content.
Introduction
New advances in machine learning and the abundance of speech datasets have made Automated Speech Recognition (ASR) systems, with very high accuracy, a reality [13, 18, 26, 29] . ASR systems match human performance on standard datasets [13, 18, 26, 29, 43] , at a fraction of the time and effort. ASR systems offer their users the means to transcribe speech data at a scale. This scalability is desirable in many domains, such as journalism, law, business, education, and health care, where cost, delay, and trust issues prohibit the application of manual transcription [21] .
Several companies, such as Google and Amazon, provide online APIs for ASR. A user uploads a speech file to the cloud and receives its transcript in near real-time. This convenience, however, comes at a privacy cost. A speech file contains acoustic features that can reveal sensitive information about the user, such as accent, gender, emotion, health, and even identity [38, [50] [51] [52] [53] . Additionally, the textual content of speech can be sensitive [21] . For example, medical recordings can contain private health information about patients, and business recordings can include proprietary information and trade secrets. Recent findings have indicated that cloudbased services employ humans to listen to collected recordings [10, 11] . Even without human intervention, cloud-based ASR uses input speech files to improve performance which can leak information about the individual speakers through attacks such as membership inference [37] .
Offline transcription services, such as Deep Speech from Mozilla, are a promising solution to these privacy challenges. They provide complete privacy as the speech files never leave the user's trust boundary. These systems, however, lack the data and computation resources available to major technology companies; their performance is not expected to match that of a cloud-based service provider [59] .
In this paper, we start by analyzing the privacy-utility tradeoff associated with cloud-based versus offline ASR. We find a significant gap between the performance of the offline and cloud-based transcription services. Although offline services provide perfect privacy, they exhibit poor performance on non-standard datasets, that include real-world interactions and different accents, making them unsuitable for practical usage. Hence, the following question arises: Can we bridge the gap between the offline and cloud-based ASR by providing formal privacy guarantees with improved accuracy?
We present Prεεch (privacy-preserving speech) as an answer to this question; it is an end-to-end speech transcription system that (1) protects the acoustic features of the speakers' voices and (2) protects the privacy of the textual content at (3) an improved performance relative to offline ASR. The main idea behind Prεεch is to apply a series of privacy-preserving operations to the input speech file before sending it to the cloud-based service. These operations cover the acoustic and textual dimensions of the speech file and enable Prεεch to leverage the capabilities of the cloud-based service. Textual Privacy: Prεεch segments and shuffles the input speech file to break the sequence of information in the text, effectively transforming it to a bag of words. It then injects dummy (noise) segments to provide the formal privacy guarantee of differential privacy [22] . Acoustic Privacy: Prεεch applies many-to-one voice conversion to protect the acoustic features of the input speech file and ensure noise indistinguishability (for the dummy segments). We employ a voice conversion pipeline of two stages. The first extracts phonemes from the source speech and the second synthesizes target speech from the phonemes.
We evaluated Prεεch over a set of real-world datasets comprising different speakers, accents, and genders. Our evaluation shows that Prεεch provides a superior transcription accuracy relative to Deep Speech, the state-of-the-art offline ASR. Also, Prεεch successfully prevents cloud-based services from extracting any user-specific acoustic features from the speech. Finally, applying Prεεch degrades the performance of natural language processing APIs on the transcription of the speech file.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are: • End-to-end system: We propose Prεεch, a new end-toend system that provides privacy-preserving speech transcription at an improved performance relative to offline transcription. Specifically, Prεεch provides transcriptions at a 12.30% to 32.24% improvement in word error rate over Deep Speech, while fully obfuscating the speakers' voice biometrics and allowing only a differentially private view of the textual content.
• Non-standard use of differential privacy: Prεεch uses differential privacy in a non-standard way, giving rise to a set of new challenges which we address in Sec. 4 
.3.
Prεεch is a real-world application of differential privacy which extends beyond the standard domain of datasets dealing with numeric statistics.
• Practical for real-world usage: Our evaluation on a set of non-standard real-world datasets demonstrates that Prεεch is practical for real-world usage (details in Sec. 5).
Speech Transcription Background
Speech transcription refers to the process of extracting text from the audio recording of a speech. At a high-level, a modern ASR system involves two stages. After slicing the speech file into audio frames, the first stage applies a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to produce character-level transcriptions from the spectrograms of the frame. In the next stage, a trained language model maps the output characters to full sentences [28, 45] . ASR systems are available to the users either through cloud-based online APIs or offline software.
In this paper, we study two representative examples of cloudbased transcription services from Google and Amazon and another offline service Deep Speech.
Cloud-Based Transcription
We utilize two cloud-based speech transcription services: Google's Cloud Speech-to-Text and Amazon's Transcribe. Both services support the transcription of long speech files uploaded to their remote storage. Using each service requires uploading the input speech file to a remote storage bucket at the service provider and calling the corresponding asynchronous API with a registered API key and the speech file's URI. The Google API is free for the first 60 minutes of speech and costs $0.009 for each subsequent 15 seconds; the Amazon API costs $0.0004 per second.
Offline Transcription
Currently, several offline systems are available for performing ASR tasks. 
System Model
In our setting, a user aims to obtain an accurate transcription of an audio speech file S. The speech file is associated with a ground truth transcript T g s . The user has the option of using either a cloud-based service provider (CSP), such as Google or Amazon or an offline service provider (OSP), such as Deep Speech, to obtain the transcript. We denote this transcript by T CSP Transcription Accuracy The standard metric for quantifying the accuracy loss from transcription is the Word Error Rate (WER) [28] . WER treats the transcript as a sequence of words. It models the difference between the two sequences by counting the number of deleted words (D), the number of substituted words (U), and the number of injected words (I). If the number of words in T g S is W , WER is given as:
. Consider an example: T g S is "The child jumped over the fence" and T CSP S is "The child jumped the fans." The number of words in the reference text (T g S ) is six, there is one deleted word and another substituted; thus, WER is equal to 1/3. Although WER is generally regarded as a pessimistic metric that does not capture the semantics of the transcription [27] , it is still the standard metric for comparing the performance of ASR systems over standard datasets [28] .
3 Utility-Privacy Trade-off
We investigate the utility and privacy trade-off between CSP and OSP services. In particular, we empirically evaluate the utility gap between such services and shed light on various privacy threats posed by the CSP. As explained in Sec. 2.3, we use the transcription WER as our metric for utility. The extent of private information leakage is analyzed using cloud-based APIs for voice analysis and natural language processing.
Evaluation Datasets
We provide a comprehensive evaluation of the transcription services on a wide range of standard and real-world datasets. The standard datasets are the TIMIT-TEST subset [25] , a subset from Librispeech dev-clean dataset [42] , and the DAPS (Data And Production Speech) dataset [40] . TIMIT dataset is a standard phonetically rich dataset that is usually used to benchmark speech transcription systems. The TIMIT-TEST 3 subset comprises of 1344 utterances by 183 speakers from eight major dialect regions of the United States. LibriSpeech is derived from audiobooks recordings from the LibriVox project. The subset we use consists of eleven speakers, 20 utterances each. For DAPS, we use the evaluation subset prepared for the 2018 voice conversion challenge [36] consisting of oral book scripts from 10 speakers, 5 males and 5 females.
Although these standard datasets include a diverse set of speakers, the contained speech is mostly monotonic and each utterance is spoken by one speaker. To assess the real-world performance of both systems, we also evaluate their WER on non-American accent datasets and real conversational interactions among multiple speakers of different ages and genders. For the accented dataset, we evaluate two speakers from the VCTK dataset [60] , speaker p262 of a Scottish accent and speaker p266 of an Irish accent; both speakers have 100 utterances each. For the real-world dataset, we evaluate 20 minutes of speech from the "Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use Table 1 presents the WER comparison results. The results indicate that the cloud-based services are superior to the offline service on all the datasets. The performance gap, however, is more significant on the non-standard datasets; the cloud-based service improves the WER by 60% to 80%. This result is not surprising since the cloud has access to enormous real-world datasets in addition to having huge computational power [59] . It has been reported that both Google and Amazon construct manual transcripts for some of the transcription requests to validate and update their models [10, 11] . Hence, for real-world applications, relying on cloud-based services is the most attractive option due to its high utility. However, this utility comes at the price of privacy.
Accuracy Comparison

Privacy Threats
Speech is a rich source of sensitive information. Once it is sent to the cloud, the users risk exposing their private information to the CSP or to an adversary having direct or indirect access to the stored speech at the cloud servers. An adversary can carry out a slew of powerful analyses that undermines the user's privacy along the acoustic and textual dimensions. Below, we provide a brief discussion on few of these analyses. Biometric information embedded within the audio signal of the speech file S can leak sensitive information about the users, including their emotional status, health condition, gender, race, and even identity [38, [50] [51] [52] [53] . Furthermore, extracting the biometric information from S enables critical attacks like speech synthesis and impersonation attacks [34, 55, 62, 63] .
In this section, we showcase few representative examples of how cloud-based APIs already possess the capability to pose significant privacy threats from acoustic features within S.
Speaker Diarization: CSPs utilize advanced diarization capabilities to identify the individual speakers within a speech file, even if the speakers have not been observed before. The basic idea is to train a neural network that extracts a speakerspecific embedding from an audio segment; segments with close enough embeddings should belong to the same speaker. We verified the strength of these diarization APIs over the four multi-speaker datasets. Table 2 evaluates the performance of the IBM diarization API using Watson's Speech-to-Text API [8] via Diarization Error Rate (DER). DER measures the fraction of time the speech file is not attributed to the correct speaker [2] . As is evident from the table, the API is able to identify the correct speakers for more than 90% of the entire duration of the dataset despite lacking any prior information about the individuals speakers.
Speaker Identification: Speaker diarization allows the CSP to separate the speech segments belonging to each speaker. A speaker identification task goes one step further; it maps the speech segments to an individual. We use the Azure Identification API from Microsoft which consists of two stages: user enrollment and identification (whether a given voice sample matches with that of somebody from the set of enrolled users). The enrollment stage only requires 30 seconds of speech of each user. We enrolled 22 speakers as follows: 10 from the DAPS dataset, 2 from the VCTK dataset, 2 from Carpenter case dataset, and 8 from the Facebook Hearing dataset. The identification accuracy was nearly 100% in all datasets of Table 1. The API was able to map the enrolled users to their corresponding speech segments accurately.
Speaker Cloning: Lastly, we applied Tacotron-based speech synthesizer from Google [30] , a network that can synthesize speech using the voice of any speaker. The network generates an embedding of a target speaker which it uses to synthesize speech on a given piece of text. In our setting, we used the network to generate the embeddings of the speakers in our evaluation datasets. Then, we synthesized speech using the embeddings generated for speakers from the VCTK (2 speakers), Facebook Hearing (1 speaker), and Carpenter (2 speakers) datasets. We generated eight speech segments for each speaker. We enrolled the speakers in Azure's Speech Identification API and tested whether the API can successfully map the synthesized segments to the correct speaker. With the exception of the second speaker in Carpenter, the API correctly identified all the speakers.
Text Analysis
Beyond the speech biometric information, the textual content of the recording could also be sensitive to the users. CSPs possess advanced Natural Language Processing (NLP) capabilities enable advanced automated analyses on large sets of documents, including speech transcripts. These analyses fall into two broad categories. The first type involves identifying specific words from the transcript that correspond to highly sensitive information. Examples of such sensitive words can be address, name of the client, SSN, credit card number etc. To this end, the CSP can perform entity (like event, location, number) extraction from the text and analyze them [23] .
The other type includes analyzing the entire transcript on the whole with the goal of extracting some semantic information. This analysis uses two type of information: the set of the words (i.e., bag-of-words representation of the transcript) and their order of appearance. The most natural and common place analysis that treats a document as a bag-of-words is topic modeling [48, 57] . Informally, a topic modeler aims at discovering some hidden semantic structure of a corpus of documents that would shed light on the abstract "topics" that occur in the corpus. One concrete example of an analysis that utilizes the word ordering information of the words, in addition to the information about the set of words, is sentiment analysis (understanding the overall attitude in a block of text). Text categorization is another example; it refers to classifying a document according to a set of predetermined labels. For example, Google's Natural Language API can classify a document within a set of 620 fine-grained labels.
Summary
In conclusion, the user has two options for speech transcription: cloud-based or offline transcription services. Both options come at the extreme ends of the privacy-utility spectrum. Offline transcription provides perfect privacy; the speech files never leave the user's computing space. However, their transcription error rates are significantly higher than that of cloud-based transcription services especially for non-standard speech files that include different accents, noise conditions, recording hardware, and voice levels. On the other hand, devastating privacy violations accompany cloud-based transcription services. This trade-off motivates the need for practical systems that can transcribe speech files with high accuracy at a minimal cost to privacy.
Prεεch
We present Prεεch that protects the users' privacy while assuring high accuracy speech transcription by leveraging the cloud-based transcription services. Prεεch lies at an intermediate point along the utility-privacy spectrum of speech transcription. It aims to satisfy three design goals: preserving the utility of the transcription, protecting the voice privacy of the users, and protecting the textual content. The main idea behind Prεεch is to apply a series of privacy-preserving operations to the input speech file before sending it to the cloud-based service. These operations cover the acoustic and textual dimensions of the speech file and enable Prεεch to leverage the capabilities of the cloud-based provider. We give a brief overview of Prεεch's privacy preserving operations.
Overview
Preserving Textual Privacy
Prεεch protects the privacy of the textual content of input speech file S by the following three operationsSegmentation and shuffling: Prεεch breaks S into a sequence of segments, denoted by S, each containing at most two non-stop words. This is followed by shuffling the segments to remove all ordering information. Thus, segmenting and shuffling S effectively transforms its textual content to a bag-of-words representation.
Sensitive word scrubbing: Prεεch runs an offline transcriber on S to perform keyword spotting: identify portions of the speech that correspond to keywords sensitive to the user, such as numbers, proper nouns or any other user specified words. Despite their high WER, offline transcribers can spot keywords with high accuracy. After the user defines the sensitive keyword list, Prεεch applies keyword spotting to each of the segments. Segments containing a keyword are passed to the offline transcription service instead of the cloud-based service (used for the rest of the segments).
Dummy word injection to ensure differential privacy:
The bag-of-words representation of a transcript essentially corresponds to its word histogram (details in Sec. 4.3). As discussed in Sec. 3.3.2, a concrete example of an attack based on the word histogram of the transcript is when the CSP builds a topic model for T CSP S . Thus, protecting the privacy of this topic model is a primary focus of Prεεch and the privacy guarantee we choose is that of differential privacy. To this end, Prεεch ensures differential privacy by adding a suitable amount of dummy words to S before sending to over to the CSP. This way, the CSP is allowed only a differentially private view of the word histogram and the topic model built using it (by Thm. 4.1, details in Sec. 4.3).
The main challenge in this setting is that the dummy words have to be added in the speech domain, which Prεεch addresses as follows. First, Prεεch estimates the general domain of the text for S (specifically its vocabulary, details in Sec. 4.3) from an offline transcriber. Next, it generates dummy text segments from a corpus of non-publicly available documents with the same vocabulary. Finally, Prεεch applies text-tospeech (TTS) transforms to these dummy segments and adds them to the input speech file S. However, leaving it just at this would still be insufficient as the CSP can potentially distinguish between the two different sources of speech (dummy segments after applying TTS and segments in S). This is tackled in Prεεch by voice conversion which is discussed next.
Note: As stated in Sec. 3.3.2, text based attacks exploit either individual sensitive words or the semantic order of the words or the word histogram. Prεεch protects privacy along all three dimensions (see Sec. 5.2 for evaluation results).
Preserving Voice Privacy
Voice conversion, VC, is a standard technique in speech processing to transform the voice of a source speaker of a speech segment to that of a target speaker. Prεεch uses voice conversion to fulfill a two-fold agenda. First, it protects the sensitive voice-related biometric features in S. Second, voice conversion ensures that the dummy segments (noise added to ensure differential privacy) are indistinguishable from the original speech file segments in the speech domain.
The conventional approach in VC relies on spectral transformation of the source speech to match the spectrum of a target speaker [31] . Although this technique can hide some of the biometric information extracted from the spectrum and pitch of the speech, it is ineffective against high-level features like the speaker's accent. In general, the TTS generated speech segments and the input speech segments are bound to differ in some high-level speaker features like accent. Thus, the aforementioned VC approach is ill-suited for our setting.
A second approach in VC follows a two-stage mechanism [35, 58] . The first stage extracts the sequence of phonemes from the speech file, which represent the basic units of speech in a language. In the second stage, a new speech file is generated from these phonemes via speech synthesis. Thus, by separating phoneme extraction and speech synthesis, this mechanism hides all high-level speaker features by design. Prεεch follows this approach by extracting the phonemes from the input speech segments and TTS-generated dummy segments. Then, it passes these phonemes through the same speech synthesis engine to generate the new speech file that is to be sent to the CSP.
End-to-End System Description
Fig. 1 depicts the workflow of Prεεch. Given a speech file S, the first step (1) is break S into segments containing at most two non-stop words. The outcome of this step is a set of disjoint and short speech segments, S. This is followed by a phase of sensitive word scrubbing (2) where speech segments containing numbers, proper nouns and user specified keywords are removed from S. Next (3), given the general domain of S's textual content (i.e., its vocabulary), Prεεch generates a set of text segments (as is suitable for satisfying the differential privacy guarantee as discussed in Sec. 4.3) from an appropriate corpus of documents and subjects it to TTS transformation (4). At this point, Prεεch has audio segments for the input speech, S as well as the dummy segments, S d . The fifth step (5) is to apply VC over all the segments in S S d to convert them to the same target speaker. This process hides the voice features of S and ensures that the segments in S and S d are indistinguishable. This is followed by Prεεch partitioning S across N > 0 CSPs (details in Sec. 4.3). This partitioning reduces the amount of dummy segments that are required to achieve the differential privacy guarantee (details in Sec. 4.3). Next, Prεεch adds a suitable amount of dummy segments from S d to each partition S i , i ∈ [N] and shuffles them. Additionally, Prεεch keeps track of time-stamps of the dummy segments, T S i and order of shuffling, Order i for each such partition (6). After obtaining the transcript (7) for each partition from the N CSPs, Prεεch removes the transcribed words corresponding to the dummy segments and de-shuffles the remaining portion of the transcript using T S i and Order i , and outputs the final transcript to the user (8) .
In what follows, we elaborate on the key components of Silence Non-speech s4 s5 s6
Non-speech s1 s2 s3 Prεεch, namely segmentation, differentially private word histogram release and voice conversion.
Segmentation Algorithm
A key component of Prεεch is breaking the textual context by segmenting the speech file. We represent the speech file as a sequence of segments, S where each segment can contain multiple words. Segmenting S presents with a major challenge: smaller segments result in better privacy guarantee, at the expense of deteriorated accuracy for speech recognition.
On the other hand, longer segments retain more semantic context which improves the transcription accuracy but increases privacy loss. Prεεch allows the user to tune the length of the segments as a means to control this privacy utility trade-off. We use a hierarchical segmentation approach in Prεεch that starts off with a stage of silence period detection based on energy followed by pitch detection to detect speech segments for finer segmentation. The algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We define a period of silence as the time duration when the RMS power of the speech signal drops below -35 dB for at least 500ms. The initial segmentation stage performs coarse detection of such silence periods from S. Thus, the resulting coarse segments correspond to periods of non-silence (spoken utterances) which are separated by periods of silence. A human speech signal can be viewed as a modulated periodic signal where the signal period is commonly referred to as the glottal cycle [39] . These cycles are an identifying feature of the human speech; they encode pitch information as well as the pronounced phonemes. In the second stage of the segmentation algorithm, Prεεch uses the existence of glottal cycles [15] to identify the presence of human voice. This breaks down the coarse segments into finer ones where each such smaller segment is a continuous period of speech. A time duration of at least 20 ms without the presence of glottal cycles is regarded as non-speech.
As some segments might be abrupt or too short to allow for correct speech recognition, Prεεch performs two additional optimization steps. Firstly, it merges nearby fine segments to ensure a minimum duration per segment. Secondly, it does not partition segments at the boundaries of the identified human speech and allows 40 ms of non-speech to be included at the beginning and the end of each segment. The minimum duration of the segment after the merging step is the hyper-parameter that controls the segmentation's privacyutility trade-off. Fig. 3 shows the trade-off between the number of words per segment and WER as function of the segmentation hyperparameter. As expected, increasing the minimum duration of a segment results in an increase in the number of words per segment. The WER in turn drops when the number of words per segment increase as the transcription service has more textual context. The results in Fig. 3 indicate that for two real-world datasets, the number of words per segment can be kept between 2 and 3 with an acceptable degradation of the WER. Recall that the nominal WER for the Facebook dataset is close to 6% (Table 1) ; through segmentation, the WER drops only to 10% for very short segments. For Prεεch we ensure that each speech segment generated as above, contain at most two non-stop words.
Differentially Private Word Histogram
We define vocabulary, V , to be the domain of words from which the correct transcription T g S is generated. V consists of non-stop and stemmed words only. Let c i denote the frequency of the word w i ∈ V in T g S . As is typical in NLP literature, we model the transcription as a bag of words:
-the count vector of BoW . In other words, the bag of words model represents a histogram on the vocabulary, i.e., a mapping from V to [N] |V | .
Privacy Definition
As discussed in Sec. 3.3.2, the aforementioned word histogram is sensitive and can only be released to the CSP in a privacy-preserving fashion. Our privacy guarantee of choice is differential privacy (DP) which has become the de-facto standard for achieving data privacy [19, 22, 24] . Differential privacy provides provable privacy guarantees and is typically achieved by adding noise to the sensitive data. 
In our context, the DP guarantee informally means that from the CSP's perspective, the observed noisy histogram, H, could have been generated from any histogram within a distance d from the original histogram, H. In other words, fromH the CSP will not be able to distinguish between T CSP S and any other transcript that differs from T CSP S in d words from V .
An important result for differential privacy is that any postprocessing computation performed on the output of a differentially private algorithm does not cause any loss in privacy. Another result is that the privacy of DP-mechanism can be amplified if it is preceded by a sampling step. Theorem 4.2. Let A be an (ε, δ)-DP algorithm and D is an input dataset. Let A be another algorithm that runs A on a random subset of D obtained by sampling it with probability β. Algorithm A will satisfy ε , δ -DP where ε = ln(1+β(e ε − 1)) and δ < βδ.
Additionally, we define a DP mechanism namely the truncated Laplace mechanism which is used in Prεεch.
Definition 4.2 (Truncated Laplace mechanism for histogram [14] ). Given a histogram H, the truncated Laplace mechanism, Lp(ε, δ, d), adds a non-negative integer noise vector [max(η, 0)] |V | to H, where η ∈ Z follows a distribution, denoted by L(ε, δ, d) that has a probability density function
Theorem 4.3. The truncated Laplace mechanism satisfies (ε, δ)-DP for d-distant histogram releases [14] . Fig. 4 visualizes the histogram of the Facebook dataset as a word cloud for different noise levels. As evident from the original word cloud, the histogram emphasizes few important words such as Facebook, people, information, and users. With increased value of d, the resulting histogram has a roughly uniform distribution of the included words.
Discussion
Prεεch's use of DP is different from the most standard usecase of DP (like numeric datasets). In our setting, we are dealing with concrete units like English words instead of numeric data statistics. This introduces some new challenges; we discuss these challenges and how Prεεch circumvents them in this section. Vocabulary definition: The foremost task for defining the word histogram is defining the vocabulary, V . The most naive approach to define V is to consider the total set of all English stemmed and non-stop words. Quite evidently, such a vocabulary would be prohibitively large for efficient practical usage.
However, note that such a definition of V is an overkill as no real-world document would contain all possible English words. Recall that our ultimate objective is to protect the topic model that is built on top of the transcript, T CSP S . Typically any standard topic modeler captures only the top m percentile most frequent words in a transcript [48, 57] . Thus, intuitively as long as the counts of the most common words of the transcript are protected (via DP), the subsequent topic model will be privacy-preserving too. To this end, Prεεch makes an estimate of T S 's most common words from an offline transcription service. Although, existing offline transcribers have high WER, we found that they are able to identify the most common words of S with very high accuracy. Thus, formally V = {w|w ∈ {top m percentile of most frequent words in T OSP S
}}.
Note that V should be devoid of all sensitive words are scrubbed off from S in step 2 ( Fig. 1 . In Sec. 5.2, we evaluate the trade-off ensuing from extending the vocabulary to words outside the transcript.
Specificities of word histogram:
As discussed above, the goal of the DP mechanism is to generate noisy counts for each w i ∈ V . An artifact of our setting is that this noise has to be non-negative and integral. This is because dummy words (for the noisy counts) can only be added to S, removing any word from S is not feasible as this would entail in recognizing the word directly from S which would require transcription. Hence, Prεεch uses the truncated Laplace mechanism which ensures that the noise to be added is non-negative and integral.
Setting privacy parameters:
The parameters ε and δ quantify the privacy provided by a DP-mechanism; their lower values correspond to higher privacy. The distance parameter d, can be used to quantify by how much should the noisy topic models computed by the CSP (from T CSP S ) differ from that of the original topic model (computed from T g S ).
Let us assume that the user has a set of speech files {S j } to be transcribed. Let D j denote the ground truth transcript corresponding to speech file S j . The objective is to learn t topics from the corpus j D j with at least k words per topic (a topic is a distribution over a subset of words from the corpus). The following theorem (Thm. 4.4) provides a lower bound on the pairwise 1 -norm distance between the true and noisy topics as a function of the privacy parameters of the differentially private word histogram release mechanism.
Theorem 4.4. For any pair of topics
, |D j | is the total number of words in D j , ω j is the total number of unique words, v is the variance of the distribution Lp(ε ,
β (e ε − 1)), δ = βδ and |w l, j | is the number of times the word w l ∈ V appears in transcript D j .
The proof of this theorem and the descriptions of the parameters are presented in Appendix A. Prεεch uses the above theorem to set the value d.
Dummy word injection:
As discussed earlier, achieving differential privacy requires adding dummy words to S. We assume that the Prεεch has access to a corpus of non-publicly available documents with the same vocabulary. This is a valid assumption in many practical settings. For instance, in an educational institution the sensitive speech files requiring transcription might be the interviews/oral exams of the students conducted on a specific subject and the noise corpus can be recorded class lectures on the same subject. It is also reasonable to assume that the user can simply generate some documents from the same vocabulary for the purpose of noise addition. Prεεch generates a set of dummy segments, S d , from this corpus. Recall from our discussion that the segmentation algorithm of Prεεch ensures that each speech segment in S contains at most two non-stop words. To mimic this, Prεεch ensures that each dummy segment contains no more than two non-stop words. Additionally each such segment can contain only one word from the vocabulary. This means that although the physical noise addition is carried at the level segments, it is still equivalent to adding noise at the level of words (belonging to V ) as we only care about w i s ∈ V .
Since the dummy segments have to added in the speech domain, Prεεch applies TTS transforms to the segments in S d . However straightforward injection of such segments is not sufficient as the CSP will be able distinguish between S and S d (since they will have different acoustic features). Prεεch addresses this issue through VC (details in Sec. 4 
.4).
It is important to note that the theses dummy segments do not affect the WER of T CSP S . It is so because, Prεεch can exactly identify all such dummy segments (from their time stamp) and remove them from T CSP S . Additionally, since the transcription is done one segment at a time, the dummy segments do not affect the accuracy of the true segments (S) either. Segmentation and voice conversion are the culprits behind the WER degradation as will be evident in Sec. 5.2. Thus in Prεεch, the noise (in the form of dummy segments) can ensure differential privacy without affecting the utility. This is in contrast to standard usage of differential privacy for releasing numeric statistics where the noisy statistics result in a clear loss of accuracy. However, the addition of the dummy segments in Prεεch does increase the cost of using the online service which has to transcribe more speech data than needed. We analyze this additional cost in Sec. 5.2.1.
In practice we have multiple well-known cloud-based transcription services with low WER like Google Cloud Speechto-Text, Amazon's Transcribe etc. Prεεch uses this to its advantage in the following way. Prεεch splits the set of segments S into N different sets (step 3 in Sec. 4 
where N is the number of CSPs with low WER. Then, Prεεch sends each subset to a different CSP (after adding suitable noise segments to each set and shuffling them). Since each engine is owned by a different, often competing corporation, it is reasonable to assume that the CSPs do not share data among each other. Thus each subset of segments S i can be viewed as randomly sampled sets from S with sampling probability β = 1/N. From Thm. 4.2 this results in an amplification in privacy. In Sec. 5, we evaluate the trade-off between privacy, utility, and cost that ensues from utilizing more than one CSP.
Mechanism
We present the differentially private mechanism by which Prεεch generates noisy sets of speech segments for S to be sent for transcription to the CSPs. The inputs for the mechanism are (1) S -the short segments of the speech file S, (2) the privacy parameters ε and δ and (3) N -the number of cloud-based transcription services to utilize. This mechanism works as follows: • Using a large corpus of non-publicly available documents, extract all the text segments that contain words from V .
For each partition i, sample the text segments from this corpus to match the noise vector η i . This is the set of noise (dummy) segments for partition i, S d,i .
• Randomly partition S into N sets S i , i ∈ [N] where Pr[segment s goes to partition i] = β = 1/N, s ∈ S.
• For each partition i ∈ [N], shuffle the dummy segments in S d,i (after applying TTS and VC) with the segments in S i (after applying VC), and send it to the CSP i .
Steps 1-4 in the above mechanism are performed in stage 3 in Prεεch (Fig. 1) while steps 5-6 and performed in stage 6. 
Voice Conversion
The requirements of Prεεch's VC mechanism are as follows:
(1) It should map any voice, even if previously unseen to Prεεch, to the same target voice. (2) It should not leak any distinguishing features. (3) It should operate on speech composed by multiple speakers without the need to separate the speakers speeches. To meet these requirements, Prεεch deploys the two-stage many-to-one VC [58] mechanism. As shown in Fig. 5 , the first stage is a phoneme classifier that transfers the speech utterance into Phonetic PosteriorGrams (PPG) matrix. A PPG is a time-aligned phonetic class [58] , where a phoneme is the visual representation of a speech sound. Thus, the phoneme classifier removes the speakeridentifying acoustic features by mapping the spoken content into speaker-independent labels. In the second stage a speech synthesizer converts the PPGs into the target voice features.
The PPGs intermediate stage is irreversible and speakerindependent. It guarantees that the converted dummy segments and converted actual speech cannot be distinguished from each other. To the best of our knowledge, the PPGs extraction VC system is the current state-of-the-art. The best performance reported in the 2018 voice conversion challenge [36] is based on the same two-stage voice conversion mechanism [35] . However, the actual implementation of the system carries many challenges. The first stage is a performance bottle-neck as it needs large phonetically aligned training data to generalize to new unseen voice. We overcome these challenges through generating a custom training set of aligned phonemes as described in Sec. 5.1.
Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we describe the implementation specifics of Prεεch along with its evaluation.
Implementation
Below, we describe the implementation details of Prεεch's building blocks, shown in Fig. 1 .
Segmentation: We implement the two-level hierarchical segmentation algorithm described in Sec. 4.2. The silence detection based segmentation is implemented using the Python pydub package 4 . Since different speakers have different voice styles and energy levels, we applied the silence segmentation iteratively moving from relaxed to tight silence level and duration values for multi-speaker adaptation. We used Praat 5 to extract the pitch information required for the second level of the segmentation algorithm.
Sensitive Keyword Scrubbing: We employ PocketSphinx 6 for keyword spotting. We define a custom keyword list for each dataset, including the proper nouns and numbers. We tune the sensitivity value for keyword spotting as to have a near perfect true positive rate (flag all the segments including the keywords). This methodology results in false positives by flagging segments without the keywords. Our experiments show that the total duration of the segments flagged with sensitive keywords is less than 10% of the total duration of each dataset (as defined in Sec. 3), even with a long keyword list. Prεεch transcribes these segments using Deep Speech.
Generating Dummy Segments:
We rely on a set of auxiliary documents, representing the keywords of the court cases and Congress hearings evaluation documents, to generate the dummy segments. We segment each document at the same level of speech segmentation algorithm. We build a hash table associating each vocabulary word with the segments that contain it. Prεεch uses a dummy segment only once per CSP to prevent it from identifying repetitions.
Text-to-Speech: We use the multi-speaker TTS synthesizer [30] to generate the speech files corresponding to the dummy segments. The synthesizer relies on three deep networks: (1) a speaker encoding network that generates an embedding for any speaker's voice and (2) a synthesizer based on Tacotron2 [54] which generates the speaker's corresponding mel spectrogram from text, and (3) a WaveNet-based vocoder [41] that transforms the mel spectrogram into a waveform. We use pre-existing system implementation and pretrained models [6].
Voice Conversion: As shown in Fig. 5 , the VC system is divided into two deep networks. The first network, net1, segments the audio waveform into short windows, generates the MFCCs per window, and predicts the phoneme label for each window; the labels are the set of 61 phonemes from the TIMIT dataset. The second network, net2, synthesizes the phonemes into the target speaker's voice. We utilize pre-existing models architecture and hyperparameters [7] .
The training of net1 requires a set of <raw speech, aligned phones> from a multi-speaker corpus. The only corpus that has manual transcription of speech to the phones level is the TIMIT dataset -a very a limited dataset. We found that training net1 on the TIMIT dataset alone results in a very poor WER performance. For better generalization, we augment the training set by automatically generating phone-aligned transcription from standard ASR corpora. We use the Montreal Forced Aligner [4] to generate the aligned phones on LibriSpeech and TED-LIUM [49] datasets. Training net2 is based on a set of <timed-phones, raw speech> pairs from the target speaker's voice. We make use of our trained net1 to generate the data for training net2. As such, we only need data from the target speaker's utterances to train net2. This procedure also allows net2 to correct for net1's errors. We use Ljspeech 7 as the target voice for its relatively large size -24 hours of speech from a single female.
Evaluation
We evaluate how well does Prεεch meet the three design objectives of Sec. 4. In particular, we aim to answer the following questions: (Q1.) Does Prεεch preserve the transcription utility? (Q2.) Does Prεεch protect the voice biometrics of the speakers? (Q3.) Does Prεεch protect the textual content of the speech at the CSP's side? We answer these three questions, while highlighting the different trade-offs between utility and privacy that Prεεch provides the users. Some demonstrations of Prεεch are available at the anonymous link [5].
Q1. Transcription Utility
We assess the transcription WER after deploying Prεεch on the non-standard datasets. Table 1 in Sec. 3 shows the WER of the CSPs before applying Prεεch to the employed datasets. It shows the baseline performance of the CSPs and OSPs for speech transcription.
WER Analysis: Table 3 shows the final WER for each dataset after Prεεch is fully applied, compared to Deep Speech as a baseline. Since Prεεch partitions the segments between two CSPs, we show the WER for the segments sent to Google, Amazon, and the final WER after combining the segments from both the CSPs. There are three takeaways from the table.
First, the WER suffers quite a bit due to applying many-toone voice conversion; the WER drops to 10-35% compared to 5-12% in the base case CSP's performance. Adding the segmentation step degraded WER by an additional 2-3%. Recall that we trained the VC system before applying Prεεch using standard ASR corpora, while we evaluate the WER on nonstandard cases. Still, Prεεch's WER is superior to that of Deep Speech, which has been trained through hundreds of hours of speech data. Prεεch's improvement over Deep Speech ranges from 1.3% to 21.45% over the evaluation datasets which is indeed a significant result with reference to current ASR literature [18, 28, 43] .
Second, Prεεch does not have the same performance for all the datasets. This observation arises again from the lack of diversity in our training set. For example, if we break down the Carpenter set by speaker (Carpenter 1 and Carpenter 2), the speaker in Carpenter 1 speaks loudly and clearly allowing our VC system to perform well. On the other hand, the second speaker (Carpenter 2) is not as clear or loud, which results in an inferior VC performance. This finding is consistent across the CSPs and Deep Speech as well. Our experiments show that these results can be improved by adding samples of the same speaker to the training pipeline of net1 and net2. We chose not to go with this approach (or report these results) as this is not practical. Thus there is a trade-off between usability and utility: if a user has access to representative samples of a source speaker, they can use them to improve the performance of the VC system. Third, Prεεch's performance is much better when utilizing Google alone, instead of Amazon's transcription service. The performance gain when using Google alone is 12.30% to 32.24% compared to Deep Speech. The choice of using more CSPs relates to a trade-off between cost and utility. Using more CSPs reduces the amount of total noise to be added (through the sampling technique described in Sec. 4.3) at the expense of potentially degraded performance.
Q2. Voice Biometric Privacy
By design, the two-stage VC system (Sec. 4.4) removes all the identifying features from the speech file, including the speakers' voices, background noise and recording hardware. To validate this property, we conduct two experiments using the voice analysis APIs from a CSP.
In the first experiment, we assess the CSP's ability to separate speech belonging to different speakers after Prεεch applies VC. In our multi-speaker datasets, IBM diarization API detects only one speaker. Note that The DER of the IBM API was very low before applying VC as is evident from the results in Table 2 on the same datasets. Furthermore, we run the converted voice samples after adding the dummy segments (after TTS and VC) through IBM's diarization API. Again, the API detects only one speaker.
The second experiment tests Prεεch's privacy properties against a stronger adversary, who has access to samples for the true speakers. We enroll segments from the true speakers as well as the fake target speaker to Azure's Speaker Identification API from Microsoft. We pass the segments from Prεεch (after adding dummy segments and applying VC) to the API. In all cases, the API identifies the segments as belonging to the fake target speaker. Not a single segment was matched to the original speaker. Both experiments show that through many-to-one VC, Prεεch is effective in sanitizing the speakers voice and ensuring noise indistinguishability.
Q3. Textual Privacy
Prεεch follows the DP mechanism described in Sec. 4.3.3 to obfuscate the textual content in speech. We evaluate the privacy properties of Prεεch in two scenarios: in-vocabulary noise and extended-vocabulary noise. In the first scenario, we only consider adding dummy segments that correspond to words from the same vocabulary, V , as that of the input speech file; we obtain the vocabulary using offline transcription as discussed in Sec. 4.3.3. The second scenario considers an extended vocabulary which covers, in addition to words in V , a random set of words from a standard English dictionary.
Our text-based evaluation considers the following aspects:
• validating that the domain can be accurately estimated from offline transcription; • analyzing the histogram distance between the original and noisy transcripts as a function of the distance parameters; • measuring the impact of the added noise on the performance of state-of-the-art NLP APIs from Google and AWS: topic modeling, category classification, and sentiment analysis.
Vocabulary Estimation: We estimate the vocabulary (domain) using the combined offline transcription of Deep Speech and PocketSphinx. Let W represent the set of unique words in T g S . We define the accuracy of the vocabulary estimation, D acc , as the ratio between the unique count of the correctly identified words and the unique count of the words in the ground truth transcript, |W |. For our datasets, the domain estimation accuracy equals to 75.54%. We also calculate the weighted estimation accuracy defined as: D weighted = ∑ P(w est ).1 w est ∈W |W |
where P(w est ) is the weight of word w est in the true document. D weighted is more informative since it gives higher weights to the most frequent words and less weight to the distribution-tail words. The weighted estimation accuracy is 99.989% in our datasets. From the estimated |W | est we select |V | over which we apply the DP mechanism.
The choice of the vocabulary highlights another trade-off Histogram Distance: We analyze the distance between the original and noisy histograms (after applying Prεεch) and its impact on the cost of online transcription. Because of the nature of Prεεch's DP mechanism, the noise addition depends on four values only: |V |, ε, δ, and d. For all our experiments, we fix the values of ε = 1 and δ = 0.05. Fig. 6 shows the cost in USD for adding the noise for different values of |V | and d. The values of |V | are determined from our evaluation datasets. The noise cost is proportional to the number of words injected through dummy segments, the 1 distance between the original and noisy histograms. In Prεεch, adding more noise comes at an increased monetary cost, instead of a utility loss. Fig. 6 highlights the trade-off between the privacy level and the cost of adding noise. The increase in the size of vocabulary requires adding more dummy segments to maintain the same privacy level. We also consider the case of adding extendedvocabulary noise (|V |=2500), where the privacy gains come at an additional cost of $25 (using both AWS and Google).
Topic Model: We generate the topic models from the documents corresponding to the original and noisy word histograms, and evaluate their 1 distance. The topic model extraction operates on a corpus of documents; hence we included 8 more Supreme Court cases to our original evaluation datasets (Facebook Hearing and Carpenter case). The selected cases vary in the document size and the vocabulary size (Fig. 6) . In this evaluation, we treat all of these documents as one corpus; our objective is to evaluate topic modeling after applying Prεεch to the whole corpus. We use AWS Comprehend API to generate the topic model. The API needs the number of topics as a hyperparameter that ranges from 1 to 100. Based on our apriori knowledge of the true number of topics, we evaluate the topic model on the following number of topics t = 8, 10, 12, and 14.
We statistically evaluate the 1 distance between the true and noisy topics. The topic model T = {T 1 , · · · , T t } is a set of t topics where each T i , i ∈ [t] is a word distribution. We use the Hungarian algorithm [3] to match each noisy topic T i ∈ T to its closest match in T , the true topic model. We evaluate the topics 1 distance for 21 runs. For each run we generate the random noise vector per document, select the corresponding dummy segments, and evaluate the topic model on the set of original and noisy documents. Fig. 7 shows the empirical CDF of the topics 1 distance at different values of d. As the figure shows, the higher the distance parameter d, the larger is the 1 distance between true and noisy topics. Note that Fig. 7 values represent an under-estimate of the actual distance. AWS API returns as a maximum 10 words per topic, and we assume that the other vocabulary words have zero weight in the topic. Hence, for any true-noisy topic pair we only count the distance between 20 words as a max which is not the actual case. Counting all the vocabulary words results in distances that are larger than the presented values.
Category Classification: Document classification is a NLP task that identifies the main genre of a text document. Google's API can classify a document to a predefined list of 700+ document categories 8 . We, first, run the classification API over the original documents from the same topic modeling corpus. All of them classify as Law & Government.
Running the API on Prεεch processed documents, using an extended-vocabulary, dropped the classification accuracy to 0%. None of the documents got identified as any category close to legal, law, or government in this case even at the smallest value of the distance parameter chosen for our experiments (d = 2). Although a portion of the noise words belongs to the original Law & Government category, segmentation, shuffling and the out-of-vocabulary words successfully confuse the CSP's classifier. For all of them, the score falls between −0.2 and −0.9 which is expected as they represent legal documents. Next, we evaluate the scores from Prεεch processed documents considering an extended-vocabulary. We find that all scores increase towards a more positive opinion. Fig. 8 shows a heat-map of the sentiment scores as we change the distance parameter d for the set of 10 evaluation documents. Thus Prεεch's two-pronged approach -1) addition of extended-vocabulary noise 2) removal of ordering information via segmentation and shuffling, proves to be effective.
In a setting where the adversary has no apriori knowledge about the general domain of our speech, the noise addition mechanism gains extend from DP guarantee over the histogram to other NLP analysis as well.
Related Work
We provide a summary of different approaches that address the privacy problems in speech recognition, their shortcomings, and our contributions.
Privacy by Design: One class of approaches redesigns the speech recognition pipeline to be private by design. For example, Srivastava et al. proposes an encoder-decoder architecture for speech recognition [56] . The encoder resides on the user's side and generates an embedding for the speech file. The decoder, residing on the cloud, is responsible for speech recognition. The authors adversarially train the encoder to generate a representation of speech that provides good performance for ASR, but not for speaker identification. Other approaches address the problem in a secure multi-party computation setting by representing the basic operations of a traditional ASR system using cryptographic primitives [44] . This setting prevents the leakage of speech to the service provider and the model parameters to the user. VoiceGuard is an approach that performs ASR in the Trusted Execution Environment of a processor (e.g., Intel SGX), thereby preventing the service provider from accessing the speech input [16] .
While providing fundamental solutions to the privacy problem, these approaches do not fit within the current ASR ecosystem. They require redesigning the existing systems, which is not practical to assume. On the other hand, offline ASR systems [20, 45, 61] provide privacy by design but suffer in terms of utility [59] as is evident from our evaluation in Sec. 3.
Speech Sanitization: Recent approaches have considered the problem from a similar perspective as ours. They sanitize the speech before sending it to the CSP. The objective is to preserve transcription utility while obfuscating some voicerelated features. One such approach randomly perturbs the MFCC, pitch, tempo, and timing features of a speech before applying speech synthesis [59] . Others sanitize the speaker voice using vocal tract length normalization (VTLN) [46, 47] . VTLN distorts the voice by warping the frequency components of an audio signal. A recent approach modifies the features relevant to emotions from an audio signal, makes them less sensitive through a GAN [12] . The objective is to hide the emotions in speech while preserving the utility for other tasks such as speaker identification. Last but not least, adversarial attacks against speaker identification systems can provide some privacy properties. These approaches apply minimal perturbations to the speech file to mislead a speaker identification network [17, 32] .
These approaches are different from ours in two ways. First, they do not consider the textual content of the speech signal, which can leak valuable information about the user. The only exception is the approach by Qian et al. [47] , which addresses the problem of private publication of speech datasets. This approach assumes the existence of a text transcript along with the audio file, which is not the case for the speech transcription task. In addressing the textual privacy of a speech signal, Prεεch adds indistinguishable noise to the speech file. The proposed techniques, effectively relying on one-to-one voice conversion, fail to provide this property. Second, the approaches above only consider voice privacy against a limited set of features, such as speaker identification or emotion recognition. Prεεch applies many-to-one voice conversion to completely hide all features associated with the speech file and provide noise indistinguishability (details in Sec. 4.4).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed Prεεch, an end-to-end system for speech transcription that (1) protects the acoustic features of the speakers' voices and (2) protects the privacy of the textual content at (3) an improved performance relative to offline ASR. One possible future work could be extending the same framework to include other languages supported by ASR. In fact this can be extended to the task of language translations. Recall for the current implementation that Prεεch assumes access to an appropriate corpus for the purpose of generating dummy segments. Another future direction could be to synthesize these dummy segments on the fly using NLP. Now from theorem 2.1, we have
